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SHOULD WE KILL THE DINOSAURS OR WILL
THEY DIE OF NATURAL CAUSES?
Peter Brown and Lauren McCollestert
Since the industrial revolution, certain companies were able to attain
monopolistic dominance in particular markets or industries because of
the ownership of physical property such as steel mills, railroads and tele-
phone lines. Such monopolies have prompted regulatory and judicial
scrutiny as well as a desire to oust them from their dominant perches.
With the dawn of the information age, an analogous situation has arisen
in the technology industry. For example, as of this writing, Microsoft,
through the copyright it holds on the Windows platform, is the leading
provider of PC operating system software;1 Intuit, with its QuickenTm
software, dominates the market for personal financial management
software;2 and Macafee leads the market in virus detection software.3
The ownership of intellectual, as opposed to physical, property, has as-
sisted these entities in achieving their market positions.
As the publicity surrounding the Microsoft and Intel cases4 indi-
cates, the instinct to eliminate monopoly power in the technology indus-
try through traditional statutory or judicial means - i.e., enforcing
antitrust laws more stringently and/or reducing the protections afforded
by the intellectual property laws - remains strong.5 However, due to the
t Peter Brown is a managing partner in the New York office of Brown, Raysman, Mill-
stein, Felder & Steiner LLP. His practice concentrates on matters relating to intellectual prop-
erty, Internet, Year 2000, new media and computer law. Lauren McCollester is a senior
associate in the Information Technology department at Brown, Raysman, Millstein, Felder &
Steiner LLP. Her practice focuses on e-commerce agreements, strategic alliances and content
licensing, software licensing and hardware development.
1 See Linda Grant & Ron Chemow, Playing Monopoly; Rockefeller and Gates, FOR-
ruiri, June 22, 1998, at 164 fig.2.
2 See Jeffrey Kutler, Banking Warming to Intuit After an Estrangement, THE AMRICAN
BANKER, Feb 26, 1998, at 1. See also News Briefs, REPORT ON HovE BANMING & FINANLcAL
SERVICES, Jan. 16 1998, at 1, available in LEXIS, News Library, News Group File.
3 The World as a Global Village: McAffee now Leads Anit-Virus Market, Busn,_ss-
WORLD, Mar. 17, 1999, at 28.
4 See United States v. Microsoft, No. 98-1232, 2000 U.S Dist. LEXIS 4014, at *1 (Apr.
3, 2000), In re Intel Corp., FTC Complaint (No. 9288) (visited December 21, 1999)
<http:www.ftc.gov/os/1998/9806/intelfin.cmp.htm>. See also Stephen Labaton, U.S. Approves
Accord in Case Against Intel, N.Y. Tnmis, March 18, 1999 at CI; Stephen Labaton, Antitrust
Case Illuminates Tangled Ties Atop PC Industry; U.S. and Intel at Odds Over that Issue
Raises Question of Law's Limit, N.Y. TIMEs, February 22, 1999 at Cl.
5 See e.g., Arnold B. Calmann, Commentary on Antitrust: 1998-1999, THE METmoPoLi-
TAN COPORATE CouNsEL, May 1999, at 18 (Greater N.Y. Metro. Ed.); Andrew J. Glass,
Microsoft: Gates Still Standing Up to Justice, ATLANTA JouRtNAL AND CONsTrrrtON, Feb. 15,
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unique characteristics of the technology industry, the same methods and
principles that have been applied in the last century to address monopo-
listic dominance in industries such as railroad, steel and telecommunica-
tions, may not be as relevant, necessary or applicable to the technology
industry.
Part I of this paper provides a brief historical overview of the patent,
copyright and antitrust laws. Part II proposes three arguments as to why
the antitrust laws should not be vigorously applied to the technology in-
dustry as compared to historical counterparts. The paper concludes that
the unique characteristics of the technology industry, including the speed
with which it evolves, and the extent to which it is guided by consumer
needs, whims and desires, indicate that no strengthening of antitrust en-
forcement or diminishing of intellectual property rights is desirable or
necessary to eliminate market dominance in the industry. Rather, these
unique characteristics have caused and will continue to cause a self-cor-
rection or self-regulation that renders such change unnecessary.
I. HISTORICAL OVERVIEW
Many years ago, the Founding Fathers recognized the importance of
fostering creativity and invention, and in the Constitution empowered
Congress to grant patents and copyrights. 6 In 1890, as the industrial
revolution was nearing completion, Congress, partially prompted by con-
cerns regarding the potential economic consequences of industry domi-
nation by a few private entities, enacted the Sherman Antitrust Act7.
Shortly thereafter, in 1914, Congress enacted both the Clayton Act,8
which enumerated certain illegal anti-competitive activities, and the FTC
Act,9 which empowered the Federal Trade Commission to "prevent...
persons, partnerships or corporations ... from using unfair methods of
competition in or affecting commerce and unfair or deceptive acts or
practices in or affecting commerce." 10 Like patent and copyright laws,
Congress intended the Sherman, Clayton and FTC Acts to foster compe-
tition and economic growth and to prohibit the abuse of monopoly power
1998, at 18A; Joe Sims and Jeffrey Levee, An Antitrust Harmonic Convergence, INTLL C.
TUAL PROP. MAG., Jan. 1998.
6 U.S. CONST. Art.I, § 8, cl. 8. As the Ninth Circuit stated, "[P]atent law seeks to pro-
tect inventions, while inducing their introduction into the market for public benefit." Image
Technical Services, Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 125 F.3d 1195, 1214 (9th Cir. 1997) (citing
SCM Corp. v. Xerox Corp., 645 F.2d 1195, 1203 (2d Cir. 1981)).
7 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1890).
8 15 U.S.C. §§ 12-27 (1914).
9 15 U.S.C. §§ 41-58 (1914).
10 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(2) (1999).
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in particular industries and markets." Although they all have the same
goal, the focus of the Acts differ from the focus of copyright and patent
laws. The Sherman, Clayton and FTC Acts encourage competition,
while the copyright and patent laws reward innovation. 12
Throughout the 2 0 th century, law enforcement officials have used
the antitrust laws to regulate monopoly power and market dominance in
varying degrees depending upon, among other factors, the then-current
political and economic climate. 13 Similarly, in certain instances the pro-
tections afforded by the copyright and patent statutes have been ex-
11 See Image Technical Services, Inc., 125 F.3d at 1214 ("[a]ntitrust law seeks to pro-
mote and protect a competitive marketplace for the benefit of the public" (citing Standard Oil
Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 58 (1911) and SCM Corp., 645 F.2d at 1203.)).
12 See, e.g., Atari Games Corp. v. Nintendo of America, Inc., 897 F.2d 1572, 1576 (Fed.
Cir. 1990) (antitrust and patent laws are "complementary, as both are aimed at encouraging
innovation, industry and competition" (citing Loctite Corp. v. Ultraseal Ltd., 781 F.2d 861,
876-77 (Fed. Cir. 1985))); and Ronald S. Katz et. al., Intellectual Property v. Antitrust: A
False Dilemma, A.L.I.-A.B.A. COURSE OF STUDY: ANTrrRUST/INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
CLAIMS IN HIGH TECHNOLOGY MARiKTs: LITIGATING AND ADVISING 1, 3 (April 1999). But
see hnage Technical Services, Inc., 125 F.3d at 1215 (acknowledging the "obvious tension"
between antitrust and intellectual property laws); Mark Lemley, The Economic Irrationality of
the Patent Misuse Doctrine 78 CAL. L. REv. 1599, 1600 (1990) (recognizing "an inherent
conflict between the goals of the patent laws and the antitrust laws," but noting, id. at 1600 n.7,
that many commentators "oversinplif[y] the relationship" between patent law and antitrust
law).
13 Although the antitrust provisions were enacted during a Republican administration,
they have, for the most part, been vigorously enforced by both parties. See Milton Handler,
Anticipating Antitrust's Centennial, 75 CAL. L. REv. 787, 787 (1987). For example, the eco-
nomic crisis dubbed the "Panic of 1907" was partially blamed on Theodore Roosevelt's ad-
ministration's increased enforcement of the antitrust laws. See James R. Devine, The Legacy
of Albert Spalding, the Holdouts of Ty Cobb, Joe DiMaggio, and Sandy Koufax/Don Drysdale,
and the 1994-95 Strike: Baseball's Labor Disputes Are as Linear as the Game, 31 AKRON L.
Rav. 1, 7 n.24 (1997). In the early 1980s, however, a number of large antitrust cases, includ-
ing ones against IBM and the petroleum industry, were dismissed. See William E. Kovacic,
The Big, The Bad and The Merged, Tim WASHNGTON POST, Dec. 6, 1998, at Cl; Andrew F.
Popper, The Antitrust System: An Impediment to the Development of Negotiation Models, 32
Am. U.L. REv. 283, 309, 311 (1983). This lax, hands-off approach of the Reagan Administra-
tion, see Popper, supra, at 310-11; Ian Ayres and John Braithwaite, Partial-Industry Regula-
tion: A Monopsony Standard for Consumer Protection, 80 CAL. L. REV. 13, 43 (1992), carried
into the Bush Administration's antitrust enforcement policies. See Eleanor M. Fox, Toward
World Antitrust and Market Access, 91 AM. J. INT'L L. 1, 11 n.54 (1997). Today, under the
Clinton Administration, there has been a significant shift back to actively enforcing the anti-
trust laws. See, e.g., Arnold B. Calmann, Commentary on Antitrust: 1998-1999, THE MErRO-
PoLrrAN COP'ORATE CouNsEL, May 1999, at 18. One need look no farther than to the large
number of antitrust investigations and litigations commenced over the past few years. See
infra note 16 and accompanying text.
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panded 14 and refined.15 Now, however, as the United States transitions
into the information age and technology comes to dominate our econ-
omy, antitrust enforcement, and particularly its interface with copyright
and patent protections, is at the forefront of public debate. 16 The dawn
14 See, e.g., Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act, 17 U.S.C. § 302 (1998) (ex-
tending the term of protection for works by joint authors, anonymous works, pseudonymous
works and works for hire by twenty years); Lawrence Lessig, The Problem with Patents, THE
INDUSTRY STANDARD, May 3, 1999, p. 20 (criticizing recent tendency of Patent Office to grant
"bad" patents, "Patent No. 5, 715, 314, for example, gives the holder a monopoly network-
based sales systems - we call that e-commerce" and noting that such a tendency is particularly
problematic in cyberspace).
15 For example, patent and copyright protection is limited by the doctrine of misuse. The
patent misuse doctrine, which has been generally recognized and accepted in the United States
for well over fifty years, provides a defense to an infringement claim. Based on the equitable
principal of "unclean hands," a patent holder cannot seek to enforce her patent against others if
the patent holder herself has abused her rights associated with the patent. See, e.g., Morton
Salt Co. v. G.S. Suppiger Co., 314 U.S. 488, 492 (1942); Evan Ackiron, The Human Genome
Initiative and the Impact of Genetic Testing and Screening Technologies: Note and Comment:
Patents for Critical Pharmaceuticals: The AZT Case, 17 AM. J.L. AND MED. 145, 160 (1991);
David H. Marks, A Review of Recent Decisions of the United States Court of Appeals for the
Federal Circuit: Patent Licensing and Antitrust in the United States and the European Com-
munity, 35 AM. U. L. REv. 963, 969 (1996). Because this doctrine is based on equity, it is not
necessary to establish an antitrust violation to show misuse. See, e.g., Karen E. Georgenson,
Reverse Engineering of Copyrighted Software: Fair Use or Misuse?, 5 ALB. L.J. Sci. & TEcH.
291, 316 (1996); Mark A. Lemley, Symposium: Beyond Preparation: The Law and Policy of
Intellectual Property Licensing, 87 CAL. L. REv. 111, 152 (1999). During the last decade, the
rationale behind the patent misuse doctrine has been expanded to copyrights. Although not
yet universally accepted, the copyright misuse doctrine parallels the patent misuse doctrine and
provides a defense to a claim of copyright infringement where the copyright holder has en-
gaged in certain types of misconduct concerning licensing or enforcement of the copyright.
See, e.g., Lasercomb America, Inc. v. Job Reynolds, 911 F.2d 970, 976 (4 t' Cir. 1990); Ge-
orgenson, supra, at 312-13; Lemley, supra, at 151-52, 157. Furthermore, in the 1970s, the
Justice Department asserted the "Nine No-No's" for patent law which substantially mirrored
the practices which constituted patent misuse and were considered per se antitrust violations.
See Jere M. Webb and Lawrence A. Locke, Recent Development: Intellectual Property Mis-
use: Developments in the Misuse Doctrine, 4 HARv. J. LAW & TECH. 257, 260-61 (1991). The
Nine No-No's included: (1) tying; (2) mandatory patent grantback provisions; (3) non-price
sale restrictions; (4) exclusive dealing; (5) exclusive licensing; (6) mandatory package licens-
ing; (7) collecting royalties unrelated to sales of the patented items; (8) process patent sales
restrictions; and (9) resale price maintenance. See, e.g., Marks, supra, at 968 n.23 (citing
Remarks by Bruce Wilson before the Michigan State Bar Association in Trade Reg. Rep.
(CCH) 50,146 (Sept. 21, 1972)). These per se violations were rejected on behalf of the Rea-
gan Administration less than a decade later. See, e.g., Marks, supra, at 968 (citing Remarks of
Abbot B. Lipsky, Jr., Current Antitrust Division Views on Patent Licensing Practices, before
the America Bar Association Antitrust Section's National Institute on Critical Issues in Inter-
national Antitrust and Unfair Competition Law, Nov. 5, 1981, reprinted in 50 ANTITRUST L.J.
515 (1982)), in favor of a "rule of reason" analysis. See also Webb and Locke, supra, at 261.
16 The FTC's investigation of Intel (settled on March 17, 1999) and the Department of
Justice's pursuit of Microsoft have been an integral part of the news headlines. See, e.g.,
Merger: Intel and Level One Merger Receives Clearance from Federal Antitrust Agencies,
EDGE: WoRK-GRoUP COMPUrING REPORT, May 3, 1999, available in LEXIS, News Library,
News Group File (concerning Intel); Lisa Wirthman, Microsoft a Monopoly? Legal Focus is
on 'Intent,' INVESTOR's Bus. DAILY, July 28, 1998, at A8 (concerning Microsoft). In addition,
the numerous mergers announced in the recent past have fueled questions regarding the poten-
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of the information age and the rapid rise and fall of certain technology
companies has provoked discussion regarding how, if at all, industrial
age antitrust laws can and should be applied to the technology industry.
The same circumstances have also prompted debate regarding whether
the sanctioned "monopoly" afforded to technology by the copyright and
patent laws is too broad and tends to stunt competition. 17
II. DIFFERENTIATING THE TECHNOLOGY INDUSTRY
The purposes and interests served by the antitrust laws and the
copyright and patent laws, as written and as applied by courts, remain
valuable and applicable in this rapidly-evolving information age. How-
ever, as this paper asserts, the unique characteristics of the technology
industry indicate that the antitrust laws should not be strengthened' 8 and
the protections of the copyright and patent laws should not be diminished
in relation to their application to the technology industry for three rea-
sons. First, the long-recognized purpose of the copyright and patent
laws, fostering creativity and invention, is essential to the continued in-
tellectual and economic expansion in the information age. The copyright
and patent laws provide significant incentives which have fueled the en-
trepreneurial spirit upon which the technology industry has developed
and therefore should not be diminished. Second, history indicates that, in
general, an entity which dominates a technology-related market through
a "legal" monopoly conferred by the ownership of intellectual property
tial results and problems of having a few firms dominate particular sectors. For example, at
the time of this writing, AT&T, the corporate behemoth dismantled from its dominance of the
telephone industry appears poised and ready to step into dominating the cable industry with
recent acquisitions of TCI and now. MediaOne. See Michael M. Weinstein, The Nation:
AT&T's Merger Deals; Hold On. Maybe We'll Connect You., N.Y. Tnvms, May 16, 1999, §4,
at 4; see also Patrick Thibodeau, Microsoft to Depose AOL's Case on Friday, INoWoRLD
DAILY NEws, May 17, 1999 (America OnLine's merger with Netscape Communications);
Laura M. Holson, U.S. West Seen in a Merger that is Valued at $37 Billion, N.Y. Tvvfis, May
17, 1999, at A18 (describing the telecommunication company Global Crossing, Ltd.'s merger
with regional phone company U.S. West, Inc.); FED. TRADE COMMISSION, Merger of Zeneca
and Astra, Two Significant Suppliers of Pharmaceuticals, Cleared with Conditions, Mar. 25,
1999 (regarding the merger of pharmaceutical suppliers Zeneca Group PLC and Astra AB);
Oil Will Be Number One Again, THE ECONOMIsT, Nov. 28, 1998, at 64 (concerning the merger
of Exxon and Mobil).
17 See, e.g., Lawrence Lessig, The Problem with Patents, THE INDusTRY STANDARD,
May 3, 1999, at 20 (discussing the inherent dangers of overly broad patent protection, a/k/a
government-granted monopolies, in cyberspace); Mark L. Gordon, Copying to Compete: The
Tension between Copyright Protection and Antitrust Policy in Recent Non-Literal Computer
Program Copyright Infringement Cases, 15 J. MARSHALL J. COMPUTER & ItNo. L. 171 (1996)
(discussing the recent trend in computer software copyright infringement cases to narrow the
scope of copyright protection for non-literal elements to avoid creating a monopoly).
18 We do not posit that the antitrust laws should be applied any less stringently to tech-
nology companies who may engage in abusive monopolistic practices. See Image Technical
Services, Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 125 F.3d 1195, 1215 (9' Cir. 1997) ("neither patent nor
copyright holders are immune from antitrust liability").
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or otherwise will not maintain such monopoly power forever regardless
of the invocation or application of the antitrust laws. The natural and
constant evolution of the technological paradigm and changing customer
demands will cause market dominance to fade naturally. Third, the con-
suming public seeks and embraces standards, especially upon the initial
deployment of a technology with certain novel capabilities - standards
which emerge and take hold only through the market dominance of a
single entity.
A. THE IMPORTANCE OF FOSTERING CREATIVITY AND INNOVATION
Copyright and patent protections have co-existed with the antitrust
laws for over a century and each protects a unique and valuable right. 19
By preventing a monopolist in a particular market or industry from abus-
ing its position of dominance, the antitrust laws foster competition in a
way that ideally lowers prices, improves products and services, and re-
sults in more efficient business and development practices. 20
The objectives of the intellectual property laws are distinct, yet har-
monious. As the United States Supreme Court stated: "[t]he economic
philosophy behind the clause empowering Congress to grant patents and
copyrights is the conviction that encouragement of individual effort by
personal gain is the best way to advance public welfare through the talent
of authors and inventors in 'Science and useful arts.' "21 It has long been
recognized that copyright and patent protections generally serve two
goals. First, the copyright and patent laws encourage invention and crea-
tivity by providing to those who invent or create a means of recovering
the costs invested in the invention of the work, and perhaps even a means
of profiting from it.22 Second, the copyright and patent protections pro-
vide an environment in which third parties can access, view, and appreci-
19 See infra note 12 and accompanying text. Noting the tension between patent and
antitrust law, the Ninth Circuit stated "[o]ne body of law creates and protects monopoly power
while the other seeks to proscribe it." United States v. Westinghouse Electric Corp., 648 F.2d
642, 646 (9'h Cir. 1981) (citations omitted). See also Image Technical Services, Inc., 125 F.3d
at 1215 (citing Data General Corp. v. Grumman Systems Support Corp., 36 F.3d 1147, 1187
(1"h Cir. 1994)).
20 The United States Supreme Court described the Sherman Act as intending:
to be a comprehensive charter of economic liberty aimed at preserving free and un-
fettered competition as the rule of trade. [The Sherman Act] rests on the premise
that the unrestrained interaction of competitive forces will yield the best allocation of
our economic resources, the lowest prices, the highest quality and greatest material
progress, while at the same time providing an environment conducive to the preser-
vation of our democratic political and social institutions....
Northern Pacific Ry. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 4 (1958).
21 Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 219 (1954).
22 Image Technical Services, Inc., 125 F.3d at 1215 ("[flederal copyright law secure[s] a
fair return for an author's creative labor in the short run" (quoting Twentieth Century Music
Corp. v. Aiken, 422 U.S. 151, 156 (1975))).
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ate the works of others; learn or gain inspiration from such works; or
perhaps expand upon them, but in which the creator or inventor is still
provided with certain protections.2 3 Intellectual properties such as art,
literary works, mechanical devices, computer components, or other "cre-
ations" are intended to be used, viewed or read by the public. As such,
intellectual properties provide a significant public benefit, manifested,
for example, in the inspiration a book or painting may provide. Gener-
ally, however, intellectual property cannot be protected by the traditional
physical boundaries such as locks, fences, or walls that protect other
properties. The copyright and patent laws provide these "intellectual
properties" with a legal protection or boundary and thereby protect the
hard work, research and monetary efforts invested by the inventors and
creators of such properties. These protections in turn encourage contin-
ued invention and creation as those who invest the efforts know that they
shall be afforded protections sufficient perhaps to enable them to benefit
from their efforts.
These two goals - encouraging invention and creativity while simul-
taneously providing protection to the inventors and creators - are essen-
tial to the technology industry, the rapid expansion and growth of which
has been driven significantly by an entrepreneurial, innovative and crea-
tive spirit. Absent the protections the patent and copyright laws afford to
technological innovation and creativity, that entrepreneurial spirit may be
dampened. Without the security of knowing that the copyright and pat-
ent laws will protect particular manifestations of ideas, creators and in-
ventors might be less inspired to devote efforts to such creation and
innovation or might be reluctant or unwilling to make the fruits of their
creative efforts available to others.
In many instances, the copyright and patent protections provided to
the technologies created and invented by entrepreneurs has enabled their
companies and technologies to rise quickly to positions of dominance in
particular markets.24 Some argue that to prevent this dominance, the
23 See Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 480 (1974) (Patent laws promote
progress of science and useful arts by offering a right of exclusion for a limited period of time
as an incentive to inventors to risk the often enormous costs in terms of time, research and
development. The productive effort thereby fostered will have a positive effect on society
through the introduction of new products and processes of manufacture into the economy, and
the emanations by way of increased employment and better lives for our citizens); Twentieth
Century Music Corp., 422 U.S. at 156 (the copyright laws are intended to "stimulate artistic
creativity for the general public good" by providing authors with a "fair return for an author's
creative labor").
24 The emergence of Priceline.com is a prime example. The unusual grant to Price-
line.com of a business process patent catapulted the company to its position as one of the most
successful e-commerce businesses in existence. See James Hecknan, Marketers Can Say
Mine!: High Court Decisions Extends Patent Protection, IARKarNG Naws, Feb. 15, 1999, at
1; Mike Butcher, Here's $400. Get Me a Ticketd, NEw MEDIA AGE, Feb. 18, 1999, at 20;
Diane Brady, Jay S. Walker, BusnEss WEEK, Sept. 27, 1999, at EB30; Sabra Chartrand, Pat-
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copyright and patent protections should be modified or diminished in the
technology sector, perhaps through a more stringent application of the
antitrust laws.25 Indeed, the antitrust laws, as written and as applied,
serve the valid purpose of prohibiting abuses of monopoly power, and an
entity which abuses its market dominance should be punished under the
antitrust laws. However, the antitrust laws should not be utilized to di-
minish the intellectual property rights acquired by an inventor or creator
in the technology industry simply because that entity dominates a partic-
ular market through the "legal monopoly" afforded by copyright and pat-
ent protections. Such a rule would discourage innovation and creativity
because, as discussed above, often the market dominance provided via
the copyright and patent laws is the only mechanism through which an
inventor or creator gain recognition, can recover the expenses and profit
from his or her creative efforts. A dominant entity in the technology
sector that is not abusing its market position should not be treated differ-
ently or punished simply because it devoted time, effort and money to be
the "first to market" with a particular product or service.
Moreover, it is important to remember that, while copyright or pat-
ent law protects the rights of the author or inventor in a general sense,
only the actions of millions of consumers acting in unison create technol-
ogy standards which give a single company or a small group of compa-
nies market dominance. This dominant technology standard is neither
illegal nor necessarily detrimental to the market.26 As a result, no change
in the breadth of the intellectual property laws or the application of the
antitrust laws is warranted in the technology sector. Permitting antitrust
law to pierce the veil of protection afforded by copyright and patent laws
is likely to stifle the very innovation and creativity that such protection is
intended to encourage - a protection that is arguably essential to the con-
tinued growth of the technology industry.
ents: An Internet Entrepreneur Finds a Way for Newsstand Dealers to Profit from Subscrip-
tion Sales, Tim N.Y.TImas, July 26, 1999, at C8. The company went public successfully in
April, 1999, but has suffered a slight setback from the introduction of Microsoft Expedia's
reverse auction of hotel rooms. That Priceline's stock faltered with the news that the patent
might not withstand challenges to its validity by Microsoft and others, demonstrates how sig-
nificant the grant of a patent is to a fledgling company's chances for success. See Timothy J.
Mullaney, Net Monopoly No Longer?, BusINEsS WEEK, Sept. 27, 1999, at 47; David
Shabelman, Net Stocks Lower as Key Technical Level Remains Elusive, THESTaEr.CoM,
Sept. 8, 1999, available in LEXIS, News Library, News Group File; Shannon P. Duffy,
Microsoft, Priceline.com Battle Over Net Patent, THE RECORDER, Oct. 15, 1999, at 2. On
October 13, 1999, Priceline.com sued Microsoft in Federal Court in Connecticut alleging that
Microsoft's Expedia service infringes on Priceline's patent. See Ca. No. 399cv1991 (D.Conn.
1999); Microsoft Sued by Priceline, N.Y. TIMEs, October 14, 1999 at C9.
25 See generally Joel M. Cohen & Arthur J. Burke, An Overview of the Antitrust Analysis
of the Suppression of Technology, 66 Ar'rrrrgusT L. J. 421 (1998).
26 Indeed, as discussed below, a dominant standard is often desirable. See infra Part III.
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B. No MONOPOLY LASTS FOREVER
A second factor supporting the proposition that, in the technology
sector, the protections of the copyright and patent laws should not be
diminished and the application of the antitrust laws should not be broad-
ened, is that history shows that, whether dealing with hardware, software
or operating systems, no monopoly will last forever. A rapid and inces-
sant evolution characterizes the technology industry, an evolution driven
in large part by consumer demands and the speed of technological ad-
vances. These characteristics, unique to the technology industry, are
likely to cause the entity that dominates a market one day because of its
proprietary technology, to be displaced in time as technology advances
or as consumer preferences change. Several examples illustrate the
point.
1. Intel/AMD
From the early days of personal computers, Intel was the dominant
maker of microprocessors. In August 1996, at least eighty percent of all
personal computers sold contained Intel chips inside.27 Intel imple-
mented an impressive marketing plan, naming each successive and faster
chip in an "x86" format such that the 286 processor would be followed
by the faster 386 processor and the 486 and so on.28 Despite Intel's
successful advertising campaign and permeation of the market, Ad-
vanced Micro Devices ("AMD"), as well as Cyrix and NexGen, were
nipping at the heels of Intel, trying to break into the chip market by
providing an equally powerful yet less expensive alternative.
In the early 1990's, despite a court order prohibiting AMD from
using Intel's microcode in its clone of the 486 chip,29 AMD had made
significant inroads into the 386 market.30 Then, as AND was about to
release its 486 chip, Intel released its first Pentium chip. One reporter
described the Pentium chip as "a 75 MHz engine that blew the socks off
anything that AMD had in the store.31 By 1995, however, AMD was
ready to answer Intel's Pentium with its K5 microprocessor32 and later
27 McCormack, Karen Intel's Pentium Pro Chip Figures to Boot Up the Tech Giant by
50%, MONEY MAG., Aug. 1996, at 42.
28 See generally, John Dickinson, Intel Tempts Fate with New Name for Super Chip
COMPUTER SHOPPER, Jan. 1993, at 64.
29 Mark A. Kellner, Judge Sends AMD Back to the Drawing Board PC SoURcES, Feb.
1993, at 39.
30 How Digital is Intel, DATAQUEST (INDIA), Nov. 15, 1997, available in LEXIS, News
Library, News Group File.
31 Id. (arguing that Intel's access to DEC's Alpha processor technology provided Intel
with the ability to entrench itself in the chip market to the extent it did.).
32 Ron Evans, Chips off the new block, BLACK ENTERPRISE, May 1995, at 41 (noting also
the launch by NexGen of its Nx586 microprocessor and Cyrix of its M1 microprocessor.)
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its K6 chip. By the time that AMD launched its K6 chip, commentators
noted that it compared favorably to Intel's Pentium II and was "substan-
tially cheaper. ' 33 Intel and AMD are still in fierce competition, and
AMD actually pulled ahead of Intel in the race to be first to market with
its new 700 megahertz microprocessor.3 4
Thus, in the microprocessor market, Intel has faced constant chal-
lenge to its initial dominant market position as companies like AMD and
others have succeeded in developing chips that are nearly as fast as and
significantly less expensive than Intel's. AMD and others have been suc-
cessful in part because of the inevitable consumer demand for a cheaper
chip and the speed with which chip technology advanced. Surely this
competition, even in the face of the dominance Intel holds, has only ben-
efited and will continue to benefit consumers in the form of faster and
less expensive chips.35 No more stringent enforcement of the antitrust
laws or diminishing of Intel's intellectual property protections has been
necessary to attain this competition.
2. IBM/DEC
In the early 1970's, IBM dominated the computer hardware market,
believing that mainframe computing controlled the future. In the 1980's,
Digital Equipment Corporation ("DEC") dominated the market for mid-
range computers. Both companies stumbled badly as technology over-
whelmed their respective market positions. Today, IBM no longer domi-
nates the computer hardware market and Compaq, a personal computer
maker, has purchased DEC to consolidate its market position.36 Argua-
bly, these two companies lost their market domination because they were
unable or unwilling to keep up with the natural evolution of technology,
market needs and market forces.
Specifically, DEC and IBM dominated the market for hard disks
and treated all of their technology as proprietary. Each company strate-
gically declined to reveal its future plans so that customers would buy
machines that, sometimes even as soon as months later, would be re-
placed by faster and more powerful machines. In doing so, DEC and
IBM were creating consumer demand for personal computers - demand
33 See, e.g., Julia Pitta, Rival's New Processor Threat to Intel, L.A. TIms, Mar. 19,
1997, at D1; Roger Trapp, Ihtel's Latest Chip Faces Hot Competition, THE INDEPENDENT, May
2, 1997, at 24.
34 See Lawrence M. Fisher, Advanced Micro to Offer a 700-MHz Computer Chip,
N.Y.Tz4Es, Oct. 4, 1999, at C6.
35 Larry Loeb, Faster, Cheaper Chips in Store for 1999, HoME OFcE CozPurmo, Jan.
1999, at 15.
36 Joann Muller, Compaq, Digital Make it Official; Decision to Sell Maynard-based
Company Finalized at Emotional Shareholder Meeting, BOSTON GLOBE (City Edition), June
12, 1998, at C3.
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that they could not meet, arguably because of the secretive and protective
positions that they had adopted. As a result, their market control has all
but disappeared.
3. The Emergence of Linux and Java
Microsoft has undisputed control of the PC operating system market
and has built an empire on that central fact. Recently, however, two new
technologies have emerged - the Linux operating system and Sun's Java
programming language - each of which poses a significant threat to
Microsoft's empire. As discussed below, Linux and Java are, in part,
responses to consumer demand to establish an alternative to Microsoft.
Their emergence supports the theory that the rapid evolution of the tech-
nological paradigm will prevent any one company from permanently
dominating a market.
a. Linux
Many are touting the Linux operating system, a derivation of the
UNIX operating system, as a potential threat to the dominance of
Microsoft's windows operating system.37 The primary reason Linux
poses a threat to Microsoft is that it is presented as an alternative to
Microsoft's Windows system and its source code is distributed at no
charge.38 Access to the source code enables developers to manipulate
the code underlying the Linux operating system to enhance and custom-
ize its features, and thus rely on the efforts of others and the lessons
learned. Although Linux has been criticized by some for not being user-
friendly, the free availability of its source code in and of itself indicates a
significant shift in the technological paradigm in marked contrast to
Microsoft's careful control over its proprietary Windows system.39
Linux is the product of a community effort and, as a result, may represent
a viable alternative to the Microsoft Windows operating system.40
37 See, e.g. Doug Levy, Linux Creator: Next Bill Gates? USA TODAY, Jan. 7, 1999, at
3B.
38 In creating a software program, a computer programmer first writes the program in
"source code" which is the only form of the program that is readable by humans. After the
source code is written, it is translated into a binary system of "Os" and "Is" readable only by
machines (object code). Given the proprietary value inherent in the source code form of
software, software is generally licensed by a vendor in object code form only.
39 Presently, there are over twenty-two companies selling the Linux software, including
Red Hat, and Caldera Systems, although Linux can be downloaded for free on the Internet.
See Lawrence Fisher, Supporters of Linux Worry that Commercialization Could Bring Chaos,
N.Y.Tvms, Oct. 18, 1999, at C5.
40 Linux has increased its market share by 212% in the past year. See id.; Greg May,
Linux Set to Challenge Microsoft's Dominance, THE DEs Mou, ms REGISTER, April 19, 1999, at
18; Jay Greene, Comdex - Linux: Just the Rival Microsoft's Looking For, Tim SEATLIE TuVIMES,
Nov. 21, 1998 at Cl; Amy Rogers, Netscape's Andreessen: Linux Buzz 'Extremely Hot',
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b. Java
Java, a programming language for Internet and intranet applica-
tions41 that is proprietary to Sun Microsystems, has similarly emerged as
the result of a shift in the technological paradigm. Prior to Java, com-
puter applications written in a particular programming language could
only be used in conjunction with a specific operating system. Thus, pro-
grammers desiring to maximize profits wrote applications designed for
the most widely used operating systems, such as Microsoft's Windows
system. Java represents a significant evolution because it permits cross-
platform programs, i.e., programs written in Java may be run on various
operating systems.
Java is actually comprised of two parts-a programming language
to be interpreted and the interpreter. A Java program is written in "byte
code" which cannot be run alone by a computer. Instead, the "byte
code" of the Java program is "interpreted" or translated into "machine
code" by the "Java Virtual Machine," which then runs the program.42
Thus, programs written in Java are not dependent on or specific to any
particular hardware or operating system and can run on any computer
equipped with the Java Virtual Machine. The "cross-platform" nature of
Java programs poses a significant threat to Microsoft's dominance in the
operating system market. Since software developers can now write ap-
plications that can run on any operating system, there will be one less
reason for buyers to purchase computers installed with Microsoft's Win-
dows operating system. In effect, the value of Microsoft's dominance of
the operating system market has the potential of being significantly re-
duced by the existence of the cross-platform medium for Internet and
Intranet applications that Java provides-a concern even Microsoft
acknowledges. 43
As can be seen from the foregoing examples, in the technology in-
dustry, today's dominant technology may be quickly replaced by to-
morrow's improvements without any manipulations by non-market
forces, thus eliminating the need for expansive application of anti-trust
laws. In the technology sector, natural causes will kill the dinosaurs.
TECHWEB NEws, (Oct. 1, 1998) (visited Aug. 26, 1999) <http:llwww.techweb.com/wire/story/
TWB 1998100150011>.
41 An intranet is a local area network (LAN) of computers that operates the same way an
internet does, but cannot be accessed by computers outside of the network (as in a corpora-
tion's internal computer system). An internet is a network of networks accessible to anyone,
with the Internet (with a capital 'T) being the largest internet in the world.
42 See Java (visited Aug. 26, 1999) <http://www.techweb.com/encyclopedia/
defineterm?term = java>.
43 Stev Lohr and Joel Brindey, Testimony on Microsoft's League of its Own, N.Y.
TimEs, Dec. 2, 1998, at C2; Rob Fixmer, Java's Universality is a Threat to Microsoft, N.Y.
TiMEs, Nov. 19, 1998, at C4; Chris Nerney, Java Has Key Role in Microsoft-DOJ Drama,
NE-rWoRK WORLD, June 1, 1998, at 45-46.
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C. THE PUBLIC SEEKS STANDARDS
A final factor arguing against any change to the-antitrust or intellec-
tual property laws as applied to the technology sector is that users seek
and desire predictability, compatibility, and interoperability, and recog-
nize the distinct benefits of having industry standards that serve these
goals - standards which often arise only through a dominant market en-
tity. The need for uniform standards is more apparent during the nascent
stages of a developing product market because at that stage, assessments
must be made as to the utility and functionality of new products.
For example, several years ago, when publishing on the World
Wide Web was just beginning to become a reality, the early web publish-
ers quickly discovered that the formatting capabilities of the code under-
lying web pages used to indicate different typefaces, images and links to
other hypertext documents-known as "hypertext markup language" or
"html" - was insufficient to permit complex and consistent formatting of
web-published documents.44 Margins, fonts, and other style features
were not as flexible in html as they were in other publishing applications.
In addition, the viewer of a web page could alter the font, color and
underscoring on his or her computer which, in turn, would alter the way
in which the web page was displayed. Thus, the same web page would
look different to different viewers, depending upon the configurations of
the individual's system.45
In response to this "inadequacy" in the html, a private company,
Adobe, marketed a software application known as Adobe AcrobatTm,
which allows web publishers to format complex web pages, while con-
trolling how users view these pages. To encourage web publishers to use
its Acrobatm publishing tool to create web-published documents, Adobe
provides to users, free of charge, the software that allows web users to
view Acrobat-published documents. Thus, Adobe has filled a recognized
need for uniform compatibility and interoperability standards during the
infancy of the web-publishing industry. As a result, AcrobatTm has be-
come a necessary tool for web publishers, and consequently defines the
industry standard with regard to html formatting.46 Adobe reported ap-
proximately 20 million downloads of its free reader software as of Au-
gust of 1998, 47 and web users encounter more and more AcrobatTm files,
44 Richard Karpinski, Adobe Hones Net Strategy-Positions Acrobat as Wild Card for
Web, INTERNETWEEK, Oct. 9, 1995 at lAl; Michael J. Miller, Casting a Net Beyond HTML;
Future Standards on the Internet, PC MAGAZNE, Nov. 21, 1995, at 75-76; John L. Cleveland,
Acrobat or HTML: Pick the Best Path to the Web, ASAP, June 1, 1995, at 40.
45 See Karpinski, supra note 44.
46 See Adobe Founders Chart Direction of Web and Print Publishing, CANADA NEW-
sWIE, March 2, 1999, available in LEXIS, News library, Canada NewsWire file.
47 See Sandeep Junnarkar and Jeff Pelline, Adobe Seeks Silver Lining, CNET News.com
(visited Aug. 26, 1998) <http://www.news.com/News/Item/0,4,25710,00.html>.
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including IRS tax forms, other government documents, and commercial
brochures.
The establishment of such publicly demanded industry standards
have, in turn, arguably enhanced the web publishing market, as those
who desire to publish information or market products on the web know
that the viewers of such pages are seeing the same thing, as designed and
approved by the publisher or the marketer of the product. Now that a
standard is established and the web publishing industry is off to a roaring
start, the field is open for other publishing tools to emerge.48 The pres-
ence of several different publishing tools (perhaps not all available free
of charge) would arguably have created chaos in the early stages of web
publishing and arguably could have slowed its development.
Thus, the prospect of utilizing the antitrust laws or the intellectual
property laws as tools to compel the presence of numerous industry stan-
dards arguably would frustrate the market and consumer desires and may
pose significant roadblocks in the evolution and development of
technology.
CONCLUSION
The computer technology industry, even in the initial stages of its
development, has significantly influenced our society on a practical and
procedural level. With increasing regularity, new technologies emerge
that promise to enable us to accomplish a greater number of tasks, bigger
tasks, faster and cheaper.
While technology promises to revolutionize, it is also becoming ap-
parent that the technology industry does not behave with the same speed
or in a manner similar to other industries our country has nurtured. The
technology market is fueled primarily by an entrepreneurial spirit, and is
based largely on the ownership or control of intellectual property (as op-
posed to physical property). This market is guided by a consumer mar-
ket which seeks uniform industry standards, yet is more than willing to
topple a dominant market player who abuses its position or fails to keep
up with technological evolution, all without the interference of antitrust
laws. The emergence of Linux and the rapidity with which it is gaining a
market position is a perfect illustration of this phenomenon. Moreover,
the alternatives to existing dominant standards are more readily available
given the speed of dissemination permitted by technology. Finally, the
speed of technological change is a marked contrast to the time required
to pursue antitrust litigation. The time required to investigate, litigate
48 One of the latest developments in this area is the introduction of XML (extensible
markup language) that was created to expand this interoperability between web pages and
viewer computer technology beyond the limits of SGML or HTML.
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and likely appeal an antitrust case might take two to three years. In the
technology sector, three years is a virtual eternity. Within three years,
the very assumptions giving a specific technology market dominance are
likely to change and the market will have moved in a new direction.
All of these factors support the conclusion that the traditional meth-
ods of statutory and judicial intervention in the form of increased anti-
trust enforcement or the diminishing of intellectual property rights do not
have as much utility in the technology sector as in other industries.
While case law will undoubtedly evolve as current laws are applied to
accommodate new technologies, there is no policy reason that supports
imposing a different standard or applying different rules to those whose
intellectual property relates to the technology sector. The market is a far
harsher judge than any court.

